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Law was to establish uniformity of decision throughout the
various states. There seems to be little room for doubt that the
framers of the act intended, through Section 28, to settle this
particular conflict adversely to the Massachusetts rule.
The cases as they stand leave the Ohio rule in conflict with
the prevailing construction of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Nor can the law of Ohio upon this question be deemed to be
finally settled until our courts have considered the application
and effect of the provisions of the act which have been above set
forth3 0 And the question is not without practical importance,
as shown by the frequency with which cases involving it arise in
the various jurisdictions. ARTHUR H. KENT.
CONTRACTS-DEBT ARISING UNDER FOREIGN LAW-
MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Suit was brought by Humphrey to reach and apply to a
debt due to him from a German bank money seized by the Alien
Property Custodian and paid into the Treasury of the United
States. Humphrey, an American citizen, had deposited money,
payable on demand, in this German bank, and demanded it on
or about June 12, 1915. The bank refused payment under a
moratorium privilege, and this suit was brought in July, 1921,
under the Trading with the Enemy Act., The obligation was
payable in Germany in German marks. The District Court
ruled that the damages should be measured in terms of dollars at
the rate of exchange current when the demand was made. This
measure was favorable to the plaintiff, by reason of the fact that
the mark had greatly depreciated between the date of the demand
and the date on which the action was brought. Judgment for
the plaintiff was affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals., The
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in order to determine
whether the time fixed for the translation into dollars was correct.
3
°See particularly the North. Dakota case of First Nat. Bank v. Radke,
note 24, supra, in which the court held that its earlier decision in Holbert v.
Weber, note 22, supra, which adhered to the Massachusetts rule under the
N. I. L., would not be followed, because neither sec. 24 nor sec. 28 of the N. I. L.
were called to the attention of the court or their application considered in that
case. See. 28 was held clearly to change the pre-existing rule.
1U. S. Comp. Statutes, secs. 3ll5)/a-31lS,1/j.
27 Fed. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
EDITORIAL NOTES
Upon the determination of this question the Court was sharply
divided. A bare majority of the justices concurred in reversing
the judgment in the courts below, the opinion being written by
Mr. Justice Holmes. Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote a forceful
dissenting opinion, concurred in by three other justices. The
majority opinion distinguishes two earlier decisions of the Court:
Hicks v. Guiness3 on the ground that the obligation there involved
was a simple debt payable in this country; Sutherland v. Mayer'
on the ground that it involved a settlement of partnership ac-
counts where one partner was resident in Boston, and part of the
partnership funds were here and part abroad. Die Deutsche Bank
Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 47 Sup. Ct. 166 (Dec. 13, 1926).
The position of the majority of the Court cannot be more clear-
ly stated than in the words of the learned justice himself:
"A suit in this country is based upon an obligation existing
under the foreign law at the time when the suit is brought, and we
assume that when the bank failed to pay on demand its liability
was fixed at a certain number of marks both by the terms of the
contract and by the German law-but we also assume that it
was fixed in marks only, not at the extrinsic value that those
marks then had in the commodities or in the currency of another
country. On the contrary, we repeat, it was and continued to
be a liability in marks alone and was open to satisfaction by the
payment of that number of marks, at any time, with whatever
interest might have accrued, however much the mark might
have fallen in value, as compared with other things. An obliga-
tion in terms of the currencv of a country takes the risk of cur-
rency fluctuations and whether creditor or debtor profits by the
change the law takes no account of it. Obviously in fact a dollar
or a mark may have different values at different times but to the
law that establishes it it is always the same. If the debt had
been due here and the value of dollars had dropped before suit
was brought the plaintiff could recover no more dollars on that
account. A foreign debtor should be no worse off."
The majority opinion thus holds that the courts below erred
in taking the date a cause of action accrued under German law,
i. e., the date of demand, as the proper time for the translation
of marks into dollars. But it does not in so many words state
what it regards as the true rule. The syllabus to the case repre-
sents the decision as laying down the rule that the date of the
bringing of the action in our courts is the proper date for such
translation. And that is given as the gist of the decision in the
3269 U. S. 71, 46 Sup. Ct. 46, 70 I,. ed. 168 (1925).
'46 Sup. Ct. 538 (May 24, 1926).
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report of the case in the American Bar Association Journal for
December, 1926, p. 861. On the other hand the dissenting
opinion interprets the majority opinion as holding that the date
of entry of judgment is the proper date. In view of the con-
siderable time which might elapse between the bringing of the
suit and the rendition of judgment, with German currency con-
stantly and rapidly depreciating, it might make a great difference
to the plaintiff which of these rules is the one actually adopted
by the Court. It is submitted that the logic of Mr. Justice
Holmes' argument points clearly to the date of entry of judgment
as the correct rule, since under the German law the same number
of marks, plus interest for the delay, would satisfy the obligation
at the date of entry of judgment as at the date suit is brought.
The dissenting opinion criticises the majority opinion as
interpreting too'narrowly the decision in Hicks v. Guiness5 where
the debt was payable in the United States, and insists that the
distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Holmes in the principal case
from the fact that the debt was payable in Germany is fallacious;
that.the view that the judgment date should govern puts undue
emphasis upon the character of the thing to be delivered and
ignores completely the time when the delivery was to be made;
that there is no good reason for making a distinction between a
contract for the payment of marks and one for the delivery of
goods in Germany, since, so far as we are concerned, marks are not
money but a commodity; that the plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated for his loss in our courts, and in dollars, and so it is
necessary to ask, When did that loss occur, just as it would be
necessary to make that inquiry in order to fix in dollars the value
of wheat in a suit to recover for non-delivery of that commodity.
In either case, the basis of recovery ought to be the value in dollars
of the thing lost at the time of the loss. The opinion then criti-
cises the rule adopted by the majority as uncertain and incapable
of uniform application, in that the. amount which the plaintiff
will recover under it will depend upon Whether suit is promptly
brought or promptly prosecuted; whether the defendant interposes
dilatory measures; whether the call of the docket is largely in
arrears or up-to-date; and in some cases upon whether there is a
successful appeal and a new trial, with the consequent annullment
of the old judgment and rendition of a new one.
5Note 3, supra.
EDITORIAL NOTES
That there should be so sharp a division of opinion among the
justices upon the question presented is not at all surprising, for
many conflicting considerations enter into its solution. There
is a similar sharp conflict between the courts of different juris-
dictions. At least four distinct rules have been laid down as to
the rate of foreign exchange to be taken into account in assessing
damages for breach of a foreign contract.'
One line of cases, principally in Massachusetts and New York,
holds that the current rate of exchange, in an action upon a foreign
debt, will not be considered at all in computing the sum due in
American dollars, but that the par of exchange should govern.,
By par of exchange is meant the amount which the standard coin
of either country would produce when coined at the mint of the
other. The par of exchange is not liable to vary, whereas the
current rate of exchange may vary extensively. Most of these
cases were decided at a time when gold was at a premium. This
rule has the advantage of certainty and definiteness, and avoids
losses to contracting parties due to depreciation of currencies.
The chief objection to it is that it often does violence to the
contract of the parties by translating an obligation which by its
terms might be satisfied by the payment of one or more legal
tender media into, in effect, an obligation to pay gold.
The second rule finding some support in decided cases is that
the sum due in American money is to be computed according to
the current rate of exchange at the time the action is brought in
our courts. 8 This rule has the merit of avoiding any danger of
prejudice to the plaintiff due to depreciation of the foreign
currency during the considerable period of time which may elapse,
for one reason or another, between the filing of suit and entry of
judgment, and so avoids one of the principal criticisms made by
Mr. Justice Sutherland of the rule adopted in the principal case
by the majority opinion. It is also urged in favor of this rule
6Notes in II A. L. R. 363 and 33 A. L. R. 1285 contain a complete collection
of the case authorities.
7Burgess v. Alliance Ins. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 221 (1865), insurance policy
on property in foreign country; Reiser v. Parker, I Low. Dec. Fed. Cas. No.
11,685 (1868), debt for goods sold in England; Ladd v. Arkell, 8 Jones & S.
(N. Y.) 150 (1875), ditto; Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pa. 24 (1868), debt contracted
in England and payable in English currency; Bush v. Baldrey, II Allen (Mass.)
367 (1865); Stringer v. Combs, 62 Me. 160, 16 Am. Rep. 414 (1873); Swanson
v. Cooke, 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 574 (1866).
ORevillon v. Demme, 114 Misc. I, 185 N. Y. Supp. 443 (1920), action on debt
payable in France.
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that the bringing of the action in an American court is equivalent
to a demand of satisfaction here, that it then becomes the duty
of the defendant under our law to pay, and that the rights and
liabilities of the parties under our law should become crystallized as
of that date. But this rule, whatever its practical merits, has not
found extensive support in the authorities, and is perhaps difficult
to maintain upon theoretical grounds. It does not meet the
objection made by Mr. Justice Holmes that, where suit is brought
here upon a German contract, it is an obligation created by
German law which is being enforced, and the plaintiff should
stand in no better position here than he would were he suing in
Germany.
In one or two recent cases the contract has expressly provided
what rate of exchange should govern. Such contractual pro-
visions have been properly sustained, and the rate of exchange
provided in the contract held to govern.9
Save for those cases adopting the par of exchange rule, the
chief difference in view in the decisions is that represented by the
two opinions in the principal case, viz., should the rate of exchange
at the time of trial and judgment or at the time of default upon
the contract govern. Where the contract is one for the payment
of money, i. e., a contract creating a debt, the weight of authority
is in accord with the majority opinion, and applies the rate of
exchange at the time of trial and judgment.,l But if the contract
be one for the delivery of goods or rendition of services, where
default in performance gives rise only to liability for unliquidated
damages, perhaps the weight of authority is that the rate of
9Marine Ins. Co. v. McLanahan, 290 Fed. 685 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
10Lee v. Wilcocks, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 48 (1819), semble; Marburg v. Marburg,
26 Md. 8, 90 Am. Dec. 84 (1866); Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629 (1870);
Robinson v. Hall, 2 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 342 (1864); The Saigon Maru, 267 Fed.
881 (D. C. D. Ore., 1920), affirmed in 272 Fed. .799 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921);
Nickerson v. Soesman, 98 Mass. 364 (1867), action by merchant against
factorfor breach of contract in refusing to surrender notes and other evidences
of indebtedness, court refusing to apply par of exchange rule to such a case;
Sirie v. Godfrey, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N. Y..Supp. 52 (1921); The Hurona,
268 Fed. 910 (S. D. N. Y., 1920); Liberty Nat. Bank v. Burr, 270 Fed. 251
(H. D. Pa., 1921); Cropper v. Nelson, Fed. Cas. No. 3,417 (1811). All but
one or two of the above cases were actions upon debts payable in foreign
countries.
EDITORIAL NOTES
exchange at the time of default will apply." A few jurisdictions
have not made any such distinction, but apply the rate of exchange
at the time of default to both types of cases."1
While the distinction between the two kinds of contracts may
at first glance seem a plausible one, it is by no means necessary,
and it is believed that Mr. Justice Sutherland's argument that
the distinction is fallacious is sound. Unless we are to fall victim
to the inveterate tendency to conceive of an action of debt as
prcprietary, rather than contractual, .in character, it would seem
that an action upon a contract to pay money is just as much an
action for damages for non-performance as is an action upon a
contract to deliver goods. The only difference is that in the first
case the damages are liquidated; in the second, unliquidated.
If it be urged that payment of money is always performance of
the contract in the one case, but only a substitute for performance
in the other, it may be fairly answered that payment of money
after the due date is not a performance in any case, but only
compensation for failure to perform.13
"'Di Fernando v. Simon Smits & Co., 89 L. J. K. B. N. S. 1039 (1920);
Barry v. Van Den Hurk, 2 K. B. 709 (1920), where the rule worked to dis-
advantage of plaintiff through the depreciation of sterling; LeBeaupin v.
Crispin, 2 K. B. 714 (1920), where rule again worked to plaintiff's disadvantage
for the same reason; Page v. Levenson, 281 Fed. 555 (D. C. D. Md., 1922).
In all the above cases the action was upon a foreign contract, with damages
unliquidated.
The same rule was applied, however, in the following cases where the action
was to recover upon a foreign debt claim: Scott v. Bevan, 2 Barn. & Ad. 78,
109 Eng. Reprint (1831); Cash v. Kennion, 11 Ves. Jr. 314, 32 Eng. Reprint
1109 (1805), dictum by Lord Eldon; Butler v. Merchant, Tex. Civ. App.
27 S. W. 193 (1894); Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N. Y. 37, 138 N.
E. 497 (1923); Gross v. Mendel, 225 N. Y. 633, 121 N. E. 871 (1918); Dante
v. Miniggio, 54 App. D. C. 386, 298 Fed. 845 (C. A. D. C., 1924); Grunwald v.
Freese, 4 Cal. Unrep. 182, 34 Pac. 73 (1893).
"Uliendahl v. Pankhurst, W. & Co. 39 Times L. R. 628, 67 Sol. Jo. 791
(1923); Peyrae v. Wilkinson, W. N. 291, 68 Sol. Jo. 253 (1923); Hoppe v.
Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N. Y. 37, 138 N. E. 497 (1923); Guiness v. Miller,
291 Fed. 769 (S. D. N. Y., 1923), affirmed in 299 Fed. 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924);
Dante v. Miniggio, note 11, supra. But cf. with the above-cited English cases,
Cohn v. Boulken, 36 Times L. R. 767, 67 Sol. Jo. 636 (1920).
'Guiness v. Miller, note 12, supra. The court said: "There is, in my judg-
ment, no sound basis for distinction between torts and contracts to pay fixed
sums of money. The confusion arises from the assumption that payment after
the due date is performance. But that appears to be untrue. A promise to
pay a sum at a given day is not a promise to pay then or later. When the
promisor defaults, he fails to perform the only promise he has made, and
his liability is asmuch a new creation of the law as though he had failed
to deliver a chattel;-."
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Suppose, for instance, that suit is brought here upon a broken
contract for the delivery of one thousand bushels of wheat in
Germany at a specified date. We assume that the German law,
under accepted principles of the conflict of laws, will be looked
to by our courts as governing the obligation and interpretation
of the contract, and the measure of damages for non-performance,
and that the German law is proved. We further assume that
the plaintiff would have been entitled under German law to
recover one thousand marks as damages for non-performance if
suit had been brought in a German court immediately after
default. 14 Would it be urged that, if the plaintiff delayed his
suit in Germany until there had been a material depreciation of
the mark, he could recover a larger number of marks sufficient
to make up for such depreciation? Would not the payment
of one thousand marks in legal tender currency, plus whatever
amount might be allowed as interest, satisfy the judgment when
rendered, provided, of course, it did not call for payment in gold,
just as though the contract had called for the payment of one
thousand marks in German currency? And if the plaintiff, under
the principles of the conflict of laws, should not be allowed to
improve his position by suing the party in default in the courts
of another jurisdiction in the one case, upon what theory should
he be permitted so to improve his position in the other?
But though, for the purposes of the argument, the soundness
of this criticism by Mr. Justice Sutherland be conceded, it by no
means follows that the rule laid down by the majority opinion is
unsound. Rather the error may be in the rule which has been
applied in the unliquidated damage cases. We cannot agree
that it makes no difference whether the money due under a con-
tract is payable in America or Germany. In the one case, the
contract is an American contract, its obligation and interpretation
controlled by American law; in the other a German contract, with
its obligation and interpretation controlled by German law, at
least in the absence of evidence that the parties intended some
other law to apply. The issue seems to resolve itself to this-
.To what extent, if any, do sound principles of comity obligate
"As a matter of fact, the German Code makes specific performance the
normal remedy in all cases, and damages is a purely secondary remedy, to be
allowed only where for some reason specific performance cannot be obtained.
No attempt is here made to determine whether this fact should affect the legal
result under the principles of the conflict of laws.
ED1 TORIAL -NOTES
our courts to give effect to the legal tender statutes of Germany,
where suit is brought upon a German contract? There is, of
course, a regrettable lack of agreement among courts as to the
fundamental principles of the conflict of laws. Too often there
-is a paucity 'of understanding of their meaning and the proper
scope, of their application, after they have been agreed upon in
the abstract. Whether it be a domestic or a foreign contract
which is sued upon, it is necessarily our own law which the courts
apply. But, in deference to certain more or less definitely
defined principles based upon considerations of justice, conveni-
ence and practical policy, or, perhaps, better to carry out the
presumed intention of the parties, our courts, in determining the
obligation and proper interpretation of the foreign contract,
look to, or borrow, as it were, the law of the place where the
contract was made or the law of the place where it was to be
performed, rather than looking to the rules of the local law. And
courts quite naturally differ as to how far these considerations of
justice and policy require them to go.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes applies rigidly the principle
that, where a plaintiff seeks a remedy in our courts upon a foreign
cause of action, he can thereby place himself in no more advan-
tageous position, that is, can recover no more, than if he were
bringing his suit in the courts of the jurisdiction under whose
law the cause of action arose. And since the legal tender laws of
Germany would in this case preclude the German courts from
taking into account the depreciation of the mark, in determining
how many marks would satisfy the defendant's liability upon the
broken contract, the above principle requires an American court
also to ignore the depreciation. "This rigid application of the
principle no doubt works a great hardship upon the plaintiff in
the instant case. Furthermore, as the dissenting opinion points
out, the amount plaintiff will recover may often be prejudicially
affected by the delay in obtaining judgment arising from pro-
cedural difficulties, congested court calendars, and dilatory
tactics upon the part of the defendant. But this is not the only
situation where a plaintiff may be materially injured by the law's'
delays. Yet the law, beyond allowing interest in certain cases,
does not modify its rules in order to compensate the plaintiff for
the loss he has suffered thereby. Moreover, while the rule that
the rate of exchange at the time of default applies, would work
to the plaintiff's advantage in any case where the foreign (curreticy
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has depreciated materially, it would work correspondingly to his
disadvantage in any case where our own currency has depreciated
in international exchange, as it did in the years following the Civil
War." ARTHUR H. KENT.
STOP PAYMENT ORDERS ON CERTIFIED CHECKS
The rule in Ohio and perhaps in some other jurisdictions,
is well established that the drawer of a check which has been
certified cannot stop payment thereon after certification. The
leading case in Ohio establishing that proposition is Blake v. The
Hamilton Dime Savings Bank Company, 79 Ohio St. 189, decided
in 1908.
It is regrettable that this particular case should, on its facts,
the -parties to the action and the reasoning of the court, be the
source of authority for the Ohio rule; for though the general rule
that protects bona fide holders is well established and sound,2 the
opinion of the court in this case seems to constitute any holder of
"6Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629 (1870). The court said: "Perhaps a
strict application of logical reasoning to the question would lead to the result
that the premium should be estimated at the rate when the note fell due.
That was when the money should have been paid, and when the default in per-
forming the contract occurred. This conclusion would be supported by the
analogy derivedfrom the rule of damages upon contracts to deliver specific
articles, fixing the market price at the tim they ought to have been delivered
as the criterion. This rule might sometimes be to the advantage of the holder
of the notes as in the present case. In other cases, where the premium was
less at the time the note became due than at the time of trial it would be to
his detriment. And in view of these uncertainties and fluctuations in the rate,
upon the grounds of policy as well as for its tendency to do as complete justice
between the parties as is possible, we have come to the conclusion that the
true rule in such cases is to give judgment for such an amount as will, at the
time of the judgment, purchase the amount due on the note in the funds or
currency in which it is payable. To accomplish this, of course, the premium
should be estimated at the rate prevailing at the time of trial. By this rule,
the holder would neither gain nor lose by the fluctuations in the rate, but
whenever he obtained judgment would obtain it for a sun, which would then
procure him the exact amount to which he was entitled in the proper currency.
This does complete justice between the parties, and seems, therefore, to indicate
the true extent to which the difference of exchange in such cases should affect
the amount of recovery."
'Dicta in National Comiiiercial Bank v. Miller, 77 Ala. 176; Kahn v. Wal-
ton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 20 N. H. 203 (1889); Pease & Dwyer v. State National
Bank, 114 Tenn. 693, 88 S. W. 172 (1905).
